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City of Phoenix
POLICE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 'E' Agency and Officer Information:

Operation First Strike was the effort of five patrol officers and a sergeant assigned to a Neighborhood Policing bicycle squad. This group of officers identified this project, researched, planned, and executed it. The squad identified the significance of the problem and had the foresight to realize that 'The Townhomes' was a problem that traditional policing could not hope to solve. In brainstorming sessions between the unit members and the public, a multi-dimensional plan was developed. This plan addressed not only the crime, but also the underlying causes, the resulting harms, and engineered a long-term solution to solve these problems.

Other than the challenge, and the desire to expand their knowledge, there were no additional incentives given to any of the officers.

The Unit Lieutenant, Suzy Parra, gave the squad free rein in this endeavor and the Precinct Commander, Mike McCort, provided advice, guidance, and the clout to solidify partnerships and ensure participation. Commander McCort was the most educated in terms of Problem-Oriented Policing and his knowledge was a valuable resource.

One fact stands out about this particular effort: None of the officers on the 45Z Squad involved in First Strike had any training in problem-oriented policing. Our first formal exposure to the Problem Oriented Policing concept was at the 1998 POPS Convention in San Diego. It was at this conference that I realized what this group of eager, but untrained officers had really accomplished.

That these officers could develop, plan and execute a project of this scope with only limited exposure to the concept beforehand clearly illustrates just how intuitive and effective Problem-Oriented Policing can be. Additionally, it demonstrates how leaders that encourage their officers to take risks and expand their personal bounds of experience can open the doors for results that outweigh those risks, and exceed expectations.

The only problems that were encountered were normal "Murphy's Law" problems, which were anticipated. Indeed the word "Murphy" headed every white board and working paper during the planning stage. There were no problems found with the SARA model itself, other than a lack of in-depth understanding of its facets. The most serious problem was a lack of commitment

by officers outside the squad. This contributed to a less successful outcome than might have otherwise been the case.

Most of **Firs* Strike** was accomplished within normal budget resources. Overtime funds were available because of the Anti Gang Initiative grant then in effect. Most of the overtime was spent during the eight-day enforcement cycle, and this was disbursed through several different Department entities.

Contact:

Sergeant Steve Landry
Phoenix Police Department
South Mountain Precinct
400 West Southern Avenue
Phoenix, AZ, 85041

Telephone:

Work: 602 495-5004 1530-0130 Wednesday through Saturday.
Voice mail other hours.
Fax: 602 534-1566

Home: 602-955^420
Fax: 602 381-1403
E-mail: StevLandry@aol.com



City of Phoenix
POLICE DEPARTMENT

ABSTRACT: *Operation First Strike*

The Hallcraft Villas Townhomes in the South Mountain Precinct is a residential island sandwiched between industrial, warehousing, agri-businesses and Interstate! 0. For several years the Townhomes, as they are known, has suffered from a enormous rise in crime, coupled with a steady and rapid decline in property values, resident's income levels and blight. The Townhomes additionally suffer from their geography, in that there are only four entrances, in two loop roads. All of the roads are non-dedicated private property streets. Built as quadplexes, with areas of open space between groups of units and poorly lit, the Townhomes at once lent themselves to crime and were extremely difficult to patrol. Residents had given up hope, block watches were non-existent and calls for service were seldom made until after crimes had occurred.

The South Mountain Precinct's Neighborhood Policing Squad, a bicycle squad taking advantage of Anti Gang Initiative grant funds, decided to make a systematic effort into turning the Townhomes around and to get the residents involved enough to take back their neighborhood. We felt that the terrain, which worked against motorized patrol would actually benefit bicycle patrol. The private property aspect of the housing could be likewise utilized to our benefit. The squad developed a multi-faceted team effort to positively affect the area.

The project, named Operation First Strike, began with an eight-day, 24 hour per day intensive enforcement program involving several different units and squads within the department, as well as the State Gang Task Force. This zero-tolerance enforcement effort was coupled with intense media coverage and had the desired effect of eliminating street crime in the area and capturing the residents' attention.

Immediately following the enforcement phase, we began three weeks of clean up activities, graffiti removal, block watch reestablishment and community meetings. The clean up phase was an enormous partnership involving the police, residents, local businesses and civic organizations. The clean up changed the outward appearance of the complex so completely that the residents themselves were amazed at the results.

First Strike culminated in a huge block party hosted by the officers, with food and prizes donated by restaurants, businesses and the Phoenix Suns Basketball club.



City of Phoenix
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Operation First Strike

February-March, 1997

A. Scanning:

The Hallcraft Villas Townhomes is a residential island amidst industrial and agricultural interests and Interstate 10. The Townhomes, as they are known, are individually owned townhouses, primarily two story quadplexes, surrounded by large areas of grassy open space and served by only two loop roads. The Townhomes were very difficult to patrol for several reasons, and this difficulty encouraged crime to flourish. The Townhomes themselves were split into two sections, East and West, by a wide high-tension power line easement. The easement over the years had developed into a no-man's land and defacto dump. Crime, particularly in the form of street level drug sales and crack houses, led to residential burglaries and robberies. Homicides were very high for such a relatively small geographic area. Violent street gangs occupied the area and dictated the lifestyles of the residents, mostly low-income renters and Federal and City section eight housing participants. The residents did not take ownership of the neighborhood and had given up hope. Calls for service were very low, despite the high crime rate, and block watch participation was non existent. Blight was extensive. Graffiti covered buildings, walls and fences. Wooden fences were in disrepair with several burned or partially burned. Burned out shells of individual dwellings stood next to occupied units, which created a surreal image of an urban battlefield.

The Townhomes were included in the Anti-Gang Initiative grant. The Townhomes had been neglected by the police throughout the grant for several reasons. One was the isolation of the complex. It was over a mile away from the main body of the grant's target area, but the Townhomes were also in a far corner of the precinct, adjacent to the city of Tempe. The rest of the grant area was several times larger than the Townhomes, therefore receiving more resources.

The Townhomes were a nightmare to patrol. The criminal element could see officers entering, because there were only four entrances and the two loop roads. All four entrances exited onto Broadway Road. The quadplexes were scattered in an apparently random pattern with large areas of open space between clusters of units. There were large mature trees and other vegetation, and at night the lighting was minimal.

Operation First Strike really began when a few of the remaining concerned citizens in the Townhomes came to one of the AGI neighborhood meetings and requested an increased police presence within their neighborhood. Bluntly put, the Townhomes wanted their piece of the AGI pie. After the residents asked for our assistance, the squad took it upon themselves to research the problem and develop a response.

The significance of the problem was obvious, and the squad eagerly accepted the challenge. The Townhomes were a challenge. Some officers within the precinct believed the Townhomes were a lost cause. They were convinced that the numerous attempts to tame the Townhomes over the years proved that the residents liked

things the way they were, and that nothing we - a six-officer squad - could do would change it.

During brainstorming sessions, the squad identified the major crime problems. These hunches were later confirmed by statistics gathered through the Planning and Research Bureau. The six officers realized immediately that a long-term solution to the problem meant that attention had to be given to the root causes of the crime, and the resulting quality of life issues.

The residents' plea and the 'Broken Window'¹ cycle of crime came at the same time the squad was attempting to refine bicycle patrol tactics and implement community policing ideas. Neighborhood policing was a new concept for the Phoenix Police Department and the book had not yet been written on how to do it. Bicycle patrol squads had only been in the precincts for about eighteen months or so, and there was still much to learn. The geography of the Townhomes provided an environment in which the squad could utilize bicycles to our advantage and the prevailing attitude permitted the squad to take total ownership of the problem.

We were extremely fortunate that the isolated nature of the Townhomes forced us to take on the problem in its totality. The Townhomes themselves became the larger problem that had to be dealt with. Crime was one issue, but crime led us down other avenues, and each one contributed to the overall problem: The Townhomes.

We were equally fortunate that the problem was presented to us at the same time that grant funds were available, and that residents of the Townhomes decided, coincidental[^] or not, they had had all they could take of the occupation nature of their neighborhood. Timing, it is said, is everything.

As mentioned above, the Townhomes were a geographically isolated urban island neighborhood consisting of 650 housing units built as quadplexes clustered into housing groups. The entire complex was private property including the roads, which were privately maintained, non-dedicated streets. The Townhomes were separated into two sections by the power easement.

There was a specific offender group within the complex: Street gangs. Gang members and others dealt drugs and dispensed violence. Drug sales attracted users who committed various crimes to support their needs. The presence of several different violent street gangs exacerbated the already high levels of crime.

Offenses included violent crimes such as homicides, aggravated assaults and robberies. Other crimes included drug crimes, burglaries, thefts, random gunfire, vandalism, arson, and trespassing.

B. Analysis:

Several different methods were used to compile and analyze data. This was done to compare one source against others, which ensured the most accurate database. Basing the analysis on different sources gave our response a better chance of success because in some ways the disparate sources of data competed, while in other ways the data served to verify previous information.

Statistical data was compiled for the twelve months prior to **First Strike** to establish a base line for crimes to include all drug crimes, burglaries, thefts,

robberies, assaults, homicides, trespassing, loud noise complaints and shots fired complaints.

We researched calls for service, since this has been shown to be a reliable indicator, not only of the extent of the crime problem, but also the police response, neighborhood perception and involvement.

Two separate resident surveys were conducted, one during the project, and one after the entire AGI Grant had expired.

We also took a less conventional approach. The squad patrolled the Townhomes on bicycles, and this close contact with the neighborhood allowed residents to voice their input in an informal setting.

Several citizens meetings were held on the Townhomes grounds to solicit citizen input. Regularly scheduled AGI meetings were held bimonthly, and citizens were encouraged to attend.

Crime can be easily summarized with numbers and spreadsheets, however the problems within the Townhomes were much larger than just crime. We intended to solve this problem, or at least make a lasting impact, and this required that we act in the neighborhood's total interest. To do that, we needed to know what the neighbors' perceptions of the problem were. Perception was an extremely large part of the analysis and was instrumental in the project's overall success.

We combined our street knowledge about the Townhomes with statistical data and the residents' perceptions. Armed with this information and the visual impact of a blighted wasteland, the plan to combat the problem and turn around years of neglect practically created itself.

Crime and the Townhomes had gone hand in hand for several years. No one in the precinct could remember when the Townhomes weren't blighted and crime-ridden. Twenty years before, however, the Townhomes were noted for housing Arizona State University students in a garden-like setting of patios, open space and acres of green grass.

Since that time, the Townhomes steadily declined. Hallcraft Homes, the builder, went out of business years ago. Hallcraft's influence in the complex has been sorely missed, especially in terms of common area maintenance. With the declining maintenance came a drop in property values. Over the years, this became so bad that many owners simply abandoned their interests to the lenders. Speculators came in and purchased these cheap properties and rented them, but provided little in terms of upkeep.

The cycle of decline continued, resulting in an influx of low-income renters, and eventually section eight subsidized housing throughout the complex. During **First Strike**, nearly two hundred of the 650 units were or had been section eight rentals.

Eventually, crime became so pervasive that gunfire was a regular occurrence after dark, robberies and property crime were commonplace and homicides were frequent. Gangs and their associates dealt in drugs and ruled the turf with intimidation and violence. While there was never one gang that 'owned' the Townhomes, several different gangs recognized the area's fertility for drug sales, primarily because of the geography, and an uneasy truce existed to facilitate these sales. These truces often broke down into gun battles and bodies occasionally were found at dawn in the common areas over the years.

Crack was the drug of choice in the Townhomes. The crack cocaine epidemic was at its height, and the heart of the crack industry in Phoenix was here in South Phoenix, historically the poorest section of the city. Sales were rampant, and several crack houses operated openly. The complex was known throughout the Valley as a major drug marketplace. In addition to sellers, crack users lived in the complex and others lived in nearby neighborhoods, traveling into the Townhomes to buy and use the drug. These street users also committed thefts and burglaries throughout the Townhomes and nearby businesses. In addition to crack, other popular drugs for sale in the Townhomes were Methamphetamine and Marijuana.

In addition to the sellers and the users, sets of at least three gangs occupied the Townhomes: West Side City, Broadway Gangsters, Gangster Disciples and even some Bloods. West Side City claimed Crips, and they and BWG were mortal enemies of the local Bloods. Gunfights and drive-by shootings occurred at least weekly, with shots fired, literally, hourly after dark.

Dealers and the gangs were motivated not only by profit, but also by power and control of an area that had effectively been written off by both the residents and the police. Prior to ***First Strike***, these criminals were able to act with near complete impunity.

The victims were the residents of the complex, and any unfortunate that chose to visit. Many of the drug buyers venturing into the area also became victims of robberies and car thefts. Several were shot.

Since the Townhomes had evolved into a low income housing area, many of the residents were effectively trapped within the walls and had abandoned hope.

Burglaries and thefts were so frequent that apartments were often burglarized between loads when moving in. At night, the gangs, drugs and the violence kept innocent people inside, with blinds closed, and televisions turned up. Pizza deliveries and cabs refused to enter the Townhomes.

While most of the surrounding area was industrial, the adjacent corner of 48th Street and Broadway was home to the Hampton Inn Hotel and a small gasoline strip shopping center. This center housed a self-serve Texaco gas station, a Texaco Star Mart convenience store, an A&W Root Beer outlet, and four small specialty shops. All of these stores and frequently their patrons became victims of robberies, and several shootings occurred here as well. Always, the perpetrators escaped into the Townhomes. The Hampton Inn had problems too. Burglaries from vehicle were common despite security in the parking lots and crack prostitutes were a constant annoyance to the business travelers that stayed there.

The residents had given up. They never 'saw'¹ anything and the police were seldom called until after a crime had occurred and a report had to be made. Almost always the call was by the actual victim. Block watches did not exist, and virtually everyone who did not participate in the criminal activity kept inside and to themselves.

The criminal occupation of the Townhomes brought about a near total collapse of order and many services. Even elements within the Police Department were often reluctant to conduct operations within the Townhomes because of safety considerations. Since it was private property, trash collection and maintenance - even street maintenance - were privately contracted, and due to the lack of funding,

these services were accomplished at the lowest end of the low-budget spectrum. Due to the high turnover rate, crime, absentee landlords, and the subsidized housing nature of the units, the four resident associations essentially had no authority and minimal funds to do anything. As a result, units were abandoned and often burned, and once burned, were left that way as a testimony to a dream gone horribly wrong. Trash was simply tossed over fences, once the fenced patios filled up. Abandoned cars littered the pot-holed parking lots; fences were falling down and missing pickets. Here, Broken Windows was not a concept; it was a reality, and a glaring reminder to the criminals that they were immune to sanctions. One of the swimming pools, which was empty, was half-full of trash and broken concrete and not secured. Graffiti literally covered every wall that was not personally maintained. Each resident that desired it watered what grass there was. Grass in the common areas and 'playgrounds' grew by default. One of the playgrounds consisted of a basketball goal nailed to a palm tree - there was no court - and a castoff, neglected dome-shaped monkey bar that was about five feet tall.

What harms resulted from the problem? The problem turned the Townhomes into a ghetto in the truest sense of the word, a ghetto that consumed itself with crime and buried itself in despair and trash.

Prior to ***First Strike***, the problem was addressed by traditional police methods including random patrol and response to complaints. Many variations were tried, such as extra patrols and off-duty supplemental overtime. All of the traditional responses were reactive in nature and had no focus, no long-term agenda and no

goals. Police patrols were infrequent and easy to spot, given the loop road entrances and vast open areas. The results were predictable: Crime stopped when a patrol car passed by, and began again immediately thereafter. Those criminals that were interrupted simply ran into the maze of buildings and disappeared. After the many shootings, everyone disappeared; and no one, ever, saw anything.

Analysis revealed that the crime overload and prevailing economic condition resulted in resident apathy, which in turn led to social decay and a spiral of violence and crime. These social conditions permitted crime to flourish in an environment where the residents had given up hope, and retreated behind locked doors. Blight, defensiveness and a bunker mentality resulted. The cause was crime, and the underlying condition was a societal breakdown.

Analysis confirmed what we had suspected: Crime was out of control in the Townhomes. It appeared that drug crime was the foundation upon which associated crimes, such as burglary, theft, robbery and assaults, thrived. What was surprising was the depth of the crime problem. However, analysis of the calls for service, by itself, seemed to indicate that crime was not a serious problem. In reality, the residents' apathy led to underreporting of crime and the resulting skewed calls for service. However, calls for service at the neighboring Hampton Inn and Star Mart complex were quite high. This was due to different demographics and the business ethic that existed at those locations.

Before implementing ***First Strike***, several things had to be accomplished. A better understanding of local laws and regulations affecting large apartment type

complexes was needed. We had to learn what zoning codes could be brought to bear on non-conforming properties, as well as the Section Eight housing rules and regulations, the Homeowner Association bylaws and the amount of power the associations could wield within their covenants' scope.

We had to determine if the crime problem was constant, random, or confined to specific hours. We also had to determine how much impact the crime had on neighboring businesses. It was important to ascertain what impact buyers in the drug marketplace had on overall crime. Patterns, trends and routines were analyzed in order to clarify the crime picture.

A partnership had to be formed to fight the problem and how to select the partners consumed several discussions.

We had many meetings with the community, both before the implementation of **First Strike** and during it. The AGi open-forum meetings continued, along with Homeowners Association meetings, and block watches. Meetings continued after **First Strike** in the form of blockwatch meetings, and two separate block watch groups were formed, one for each of the complexes (east and west).

Open discussion continued in the form of the two resident surveys, in which the community members were able to communicate their feelings face to face with police employees.

We utilized the media as a tool to stimulate open discussion within the community. Issues, concerns and grievances were aired in this most open of all forums.

C. RESPONSE:

Once the problem and its pervasiveness were identified, the six officers on the NPO Squad were tasked with identifying possible responses. As a joint effort over a period of several weeks, a number of possible responses were identified. These responses ranged from a strict enforcement package as a part of the Anti-Gang Initiative grant, to a non-enforcement neighborhood-building effort. Each end of the spectrum had its advocates. Finally, each of these ideas were combined into one all-encompassing plan, and **Operation First Strike** was born.

We started with a 24-hour per day zero-tolerance enforcement program for eight consecutive days. We re-established block watches in an effort to increase neighborhood involvement. A media blitz was initiated to reinforce the concept of a neighborhood that cared. A huge volunteer-based clean up effort eliminated the outward signs of urban decay and blight and helped to restore neighborhood pride. In effect, we repaired the broken windows. Partly in an effort to sell the project and partly for historical reasons, Trevor Dayley, the nephew of one of the officers, video recorded the entire project from beginning to end. **"First Strike, The Video"** as we dubbed it, became a very instructive tool and has been seen nationwide.

We formed partnerships between the police, the residents, the homeowners associations and other agencies, such as Zoning and Neighborhood Services, as well as the City Councilman and local businesses.

To measure the success or failure of our plan, we again relied on competing sources. The residents overall perception of improvement or decline in several categories, was measured by resident surveys. Statistically, the changes against the established base line for identified types of crimes were compared for periods before and after **First Strike**. Finally, the totals of calls for service before, during, and after the program were compared. One measure that was hard to categorize was the visual change in the Townhomes. What had been a wasteland had turned, overnight it seemed, into an attractive, cohesive neighborhood

Our goal was to prove that a multidimensional, concentrated problem solving effort could in fact change the direction of a given neighborhood and make a long-term difference in quality of life, perception and measurable anti-crime results.

The only resource not normally available to the squad was the presence of the AGI Grant, which provided overtime funds. **First Strike** could have been accomplished without overtime, but would have taken much longer, diluting the effect. Otherwise, all of the Departments' resources would still have been available, although scheduling would have become more important and again, would have taken longer.

Resources we did use were:

- Organized Crime Bureau Gang Squad Unit
- State of Arizona Gang Task Force
- Drug Enforcement Bureau V34 Squad
- Neighborhood Response Unit
- South Mountain Precinct Community Action Officers

- South Mountain Precinct Directed Enforcement Squad
- City of Phoenix Zoning Enforcement
- City of Phoenix Neighborhood Services Division
- City Councilman Cody Williams

Our partners in ***First Strike*** included:

- Jack in the Box Restaurants
- Texaco Star Mart
- A&W Root Beer
- City Councilman Cody Williams' Office
- State of Arizona Cotton Research Laboratories
- Arizona Public Service Company
- The Phoenix Suns Basketball club
- Baylor University
- Americorps
- Hampton Inn Hotel
- Project Scrub (County Juvenile probationers)
- Boy Scouts of America
- Graffiti Busters
- Townhomes residents and resident groups
- ACM Equipment Rentals
- Trevor Dayley and Keepsake Video
- Print and broadcast media

Once the response plan was approved, we had to coordinate with all of the partners, write action plans and consolidate resources. This took several weeks and the officers on the squad did all of the planning and coordination.

Our operational problems were surprisingly minimal. The most significant problem was an overall lack of commitment by some departmental resources. This was fueled by their belief that the overall scope of the plan was too great, that we could not accomplish what we had set out to do, and that the Townhomes were a lost cause.

D. ASSESSMENT:

First Strike worked! In fact, we were overwhelmed by the success we had with this project. Overall crime was down significantly even one year later. The visible blight, trash and graffiti no longer existed. The homeowners associations were enforcing their rules and zoning regulations were also enforced. Block walls replaced all of the wooden slat fences. Block watches had been reestablished and were functioning. Residents began to take back their neighborhood and the care was obvious in gardens, paint and individual repairs.

We knew that assessment was the weak point in many SARA model projects. Our assessment was to be a continuing effort, over a long period of time. Results were assessed in several ways. We used statistics, calls for service, and a second follow up resident survey. The survey measured residents' perception of the success of the program, change in crime levels in the area and their quality of life following the

execution of the plan. The Department's Planning and Research Bureau prepared the statistics at the squad's request. The surveys were prepared by Commander McCort and were completed by police aides going door to door.

This gave us the nuts and bolts. We wanted to know whether what we started was self-perpetuating, or if periodic maintenance would be required to maintain the gains. Our gut feeling was that maintenance would be necessary, and had planned for frequent, but random enforcement sorties to keep the balance of power in favor of the residents.

How did we do?

- All of our initial goals were accomplished and most were exceeded.
- We observed measured results in decreases in crime, increases in calls for service and improved residents perception of quality of life.

All of this success was not without problems. A complete police response, in terms of belief and commitment would have made the project more effective. This lack of commitment served to make the enforcement part of the plan less effective than it could have been and probably kept the offender database lower than it might have been. In terms of maintenance however, this lack of commitment was a determining factor.

Displacement was also a concern. Initially it was felt that enforcement in the main body of the AGI grant would drive crime into the Townhomes. Then, there was concern that our efforts there would displace it elsewhere. We were aware of the displacement theory, however, much research had been done prior to the

implementation of this plan that disputed the theory. My personal street experience was in line with the latest research, and while we watched the surrounding neighborhoods for signs of displacement, no measurable signs were found.

Our long-term assessment was not without problems however. This is where the long-term results disintegrated. Monitoring and maintenance were an initial and important part of the success of the overall plan and their importance was foreseen at the time of drafting the proposal. However, what was deemed important to the NPO Squad in maintaining the overall success of the project, was perhaps not seen in the same light by various other entities within the precinct. Maintenance was not given the requisite attention, and other priorities were established. Block watches were not monitored and encouraged as vigorously as during **First Strike**. The success continued for over a year, but has declined extremely rapidly after that, to now nearly the same levels of violence and property crime that was present before. This can be attributed to a reordering of priorities and a feeling that the problem had been 'solved'¹.

The precinct is now in the process of planning another response to the current Townhomes problems. This time, everyone involved is aware of the significance of maintenance and monitoring. Hopefully, **First Strike** will serve as a learning experience for this and future projects of this nature.

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Reexamining Social Disorganization Theory Using Calls to the Police as a Measure of Crime. Barbara D. Warner and Glenn L. Pierce, Criminology, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1993



NOTES ABOUT THE DATA:

The entire process of First Strike was one of learning. This includes the use of research. A representative sampling of the data we did use is included, although the documentation fills a 4-inch binder, as well as a smaller one.

Some data had to be re-created for this application. Some of the old data had been discarded once the project was complete. The discarded data has been re-created in the format we used at the time. This data is available for review at request.

The color charts are new, due to new techniques only recently available.

Prior to 1996, calls for service were not available as a unit of measure through our Planning and Research Bureau, and these were researched manually, by addresses in the Townhomes area. This accounts for the zeros on the spreadsheet for 1996. This data is available for review.

Phoenix is divided into grid squares of about a mile for statistical and planning purposes. Until recently, requested data had to be made for an entire grid, or extrapolated manually. The grid that the Townhomes falls into is "AF38". Data on the spreadsheet reflects the entire grid, not just the Townhomes portion.


The data on the color charts is for the Townhomes area. Data for 1998 is submitted to show the rise in crime in the Townhomes area once the First Strike effort was concluded.

Our current statistical review capability is much more sophisticated, and should make future projects of this type easier to research and make the data easier to apply.

As a matter of interest, the drug crimes spikes throughout 1997 correspond to follow up maintenance enforcement. Maintenance was sporadic at best in 1998.



Townhomes area





Phoenix Police Department



Selected Grids and Date Range of Arizona Revised Statute Statistics for All Subjects

Time Period for this Report: 01/01/96 through 12/31/97

Date Report Generated Tuesday, May 04, 1999

Phoenix Police Department

Month /Year:	Precinct:	Beat	Council District	Homicide:	Sexual Assault	Agg. Assault	Robbery	Violent Crime Total *	Burglary	Theft	Auto Theft	Arson	Property Crime Total **	Drug Crimes	Total Crimes ***	Gang Involved Crime	Domestic Violence Involved	Calls for Service	Traffic Crashes
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GRID AF38

Jan 1996	South Mountain	433	8	2	0	4	6	12	18	7	7	0	32	0	44	2	3	0	0
Feb 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	4	4	8	3	6	2	0	11	0	19	0	4	0	3
Mar 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	2	4	6	16	6	3	0	25	2	33	0	2	0	3
Apr 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	0	2	2	11	6	9	0	26	1	29	2	2	0	2
May 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	7	1	8	38	8	5	0	51	2	61	0	7	0	0
Jun 1996	South Mountain	433	8	1	0	5	2	8	26	2	8	0	36	1	45	1	5	0	1
Jul 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	1	5	1	7	19	8	15	0	42	1	50	1	8	0	1
Aug 1996	South Mountain	433	8	1	0	4	3	8	12	3	9	0	24	1	33	1	5	0	0
Sep 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	1	1	2	7	7	13	0	27	1	30	2	6	0	1
Oct 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	1	3	4	8	12	3	15	0	30	2	40	0	2	0	0
Nov 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	2	5	16	3	4	0	23	0	28	0	3	0	1
Dec 1996	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	1	4	5	20	3	10	0	33	2	40	1	7	0	2
Jan 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	4	7	17	7	5	1	30	8	45	2	10	199	1
Feb 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	2	3	5	7	3	7	0	17	6	28	3	5	180	2
Mar 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	1	2	3	18	4	4	0	26	2	31	0	14	235	0
Apr 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	1	4	0	5	9	4	3	0	16	2	23	0	4	186	3
May 1997	South Mountain	433	8	1	1	2	1	5	13	2	0	0	15	2	22	0	8	207	2
Jun 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	1	4	9	8	4	0	21	1	26	2	7	216	0
Jul 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	2	2	1	5	6	1	0	0	7	4	16	0	8	175	2
Aug 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	1	0	1	9	4	1	0	14	1	16	1	6	191	0
Sep 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	4	2	6	8	8	5	0	21	1	28	0	3	219	0
Oct 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	1	3	1	5	8	2	7	0	17	3	25	0	8	170	1
Nov 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	5	2	7	7	2	1	0	10	4	21	0	8	207	0
Dec 1997	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	2	5	6	3	6	0	15	1	21	0	9	174	3

Grid Totals

5	7	72	53	137	315	110	143	1	569	48	754	18	144	2,359	26
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Month /Year:	Precinct:	Beat	Council District	Homicide:	Sexual Assault	Agg. Assault	Robbery	Violent Crime Total *	Burglary	Theft	Auto Theft	Arson	Property Crime Total **	Drug Crimes	Total Crimes ***	Gang Involved Crime	Domestic Violence Involved	Calls for Service	Traffic Crashes
Totals:				5	7	72	53	137	315	110	143	1	569	48	754	18	144	2,359	28
Selection Means:				0.21	0.29	3.00	2.21	5.71	13.13	4.58	5.96	0.04	23.71	2.00	31.42	0.75	6.00	98.29	1.17
Selection St. Deviation:				0.51	0.55	1.64	1.50	2.42	7.73	2.34	4.29	0.20	10.48	1.89	11.46	0.94	2.93	101.41	1.13
+1 St. Deviation from Mean:				-0.30	-0.26	1.36	0.71	3.29	5.40	2.24	1.67	-0.16	13.23	0.11	19.96	-0.19	3.07	-3.12	0.04
+2 St. Deviation from Mean:				0.72	0.84	4.64	3.71	8.13	20.85	6.92	10.25	0.25	34.19	3.89	42.88	1.69	8.93	190.71	2.30
+3 St. Deviation from Mean:				1.2	1.39	6.28	5.21	10.55	28.58	9.26	14.53	0.45	44.67	5.78	54.33	2.64	11.87	301.12	3.43

TOTAL GRIDS IN THIS REPORT:

NOTE: * Violent Crime Total is the sum of the totals for homicides, sexual assaults, aggravated assaults, and robberies. ** Property Crime Total is the sum of the totals for burglary, theft, auto theft, and arson. **** Total Crimes is the sum of Violent Crime Total, Property Crime Total, and Drug Crimes.

Standard Deviation Explanation: If a grid box under a crime type column, in the table, is greater or equal to the number in the +1 Standard Deviation from Mean box in the same column, then it means basically that this grid is greater than or equal to 68% of the grids for that activity or crime. If it is greater or equal to the +2 Standard Deviation from Mean box, it is greater or equal to 98% of the grids with that activity or crime (this reporting period only).



Phoenix Police Department



Selected Grids and Date Range of Arizona Revised Statute Statistics for All Subjects

Time Period for this Report: 01/01/98 through 12/31/98

Date Report Generated Tuesday, May 04, 1999

Phoenix Police Department

Month /Year:	Precinct:	Beat	Council District	Homicide:	Sexual Assault	Agg. Assault	Robbery	Violent Crime Total *	Burglary	Theft	Auto Theft	Arson	Property Crime Total **	Drug Crimes	Total Crimes ***	Gang Involved Crime	Domestic Violence Involved	Calls for Service	Traffic Crashes
--------------	-----------	------	------------------	-----------	----------------	--------------	---------	-----------------------	----------	-------	------------	-------	-------------------------	-------------	------------------	---------------------	----------------------------	-------------------	-----------------

GRID AF38

Jan 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	1	1	2	7	2	5	0	14	3	19	0	3	133	0
Feb 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	1	1	2	5	1	4	0	10	2	14	1	4	132	1
Mar 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	0	3	11	3	1	0	15	5	23	1	9	181	0
Apr 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	5	4	9	9	5	7	0	21	4	34	0	5	238	0
May 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	3	6	6	2	3	0	11	4	21	3	3	263	1
Jun 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	4	7	4	6	6	0	16	1	24	0	6	256	0
Jul 1998	South Mountain	433	8	2	0	7	4	13	6	11	5	0	22	1	36	0	6	261	2
Aug 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	4	1	5	15	9	4	0	28	1	34	0	4	221	1
Sep 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	4	0	4	5	2	5	0	12	1	17	0	5	245	0
Oct 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	2	4	6	14	2	7	0	23	2	31	0	4	251	1
Nov 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	3	0	3	16	4	12	0	32	5	40	1	6	208	0
Dec 1998	South Mountain	433	8	0	0	2	2	4	12	8	4	0	24	6	34	0	6	178	0

Grid Totals:

2	0	38	24	64	110	55	63	0	228	35	327	6	61	2,567	6
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Totals:

2	0	38	24	64	110	55	63	0	228	35	327	6	61	2,567	6
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Subgroup Means:

0.17	0.00	3.17	2.00	5.33	9.17	4.58	5.25	0.00	19.00	2.92	27.25	0.50	5.08	213.92	0.50
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Selection St. Deviation:

0.58	0.00	1.70	1.71	3.20	4.28	3.26	2.70	0.00	7.06	1.83	8.56	0.90	1.68	47.71	0.67
------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	-------	------

+1 St. Deviation from Mean:

-0.41	0.00	1.47	0.29	2.13	4.88	1.32	2.55	0.00	11.94	1.08	18.69	-0.40	3.41	166.21	-0.17
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+2 St. Deviation from Mean:

0.74	0.00	4.86	3.71	8.53	13.45	7.84	7.95	0.00	26.06	4.75	35.81	1.40	6.76	261.62	1.17
------	------	------	------	------	-------	------	------	------	-------	------	-------	------	------	--------	------

+3 St. Deviation from Mean:

1.3	0.00	6.56	5.41	11.73	17.73	11.10	10.65	0.00	33.12	6.58	44.37	2.31	8.44	309.33	1.85
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
TOTAL GRIDS IN THIS REPORT:

12


NOTE: * Violent Crime Total is the sum of the totals for homicides, sexual assaults, aggravated assaults, and robberies. ** Property Crime Total is the sum of the totals for burglary, theft, auto theft, and arson. **** Total Crimes is the sum of Violent Crime Total, Property Crime Total, and Drug Crimes.

Standard Deviation Explanation: If a grid box under a crime type column, in the table, is greater or equal to the number in the +1 Standard Deviation from Mean box in the same column, then it means basically that this grid is greater than or equal to 68% of the grids for that activity or crime. If it is greater or equal to the +2 Standard Deviation from Mean box, it is greater or equal to 95% of the grids with that activity or crime (this reporting period only).


**Reported Violent Crimes--Townhomes area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**




**Reported Violent Crimes--Townhomes area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**




**Reported Property Crimes -- Townhomes area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**




**Reported Property Crimes -- Townhomes area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**




**Reported Drug Crimes -- Townhomes area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**




**Reported Drug Crimes -- Townhomes area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**



Reported Crimes in the Townhouse area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)



**Reported Crimes in the Townhouse area
(Based on ARS grid statistics - AF38)**



Homicide, Sexual Assault,
Robbery, Aggravated Assault,
Burglary, Theft, Auto Theft,
Arson, and Drug Crimes

SURVEY

The Phoenix Police Department has worked with the _____ neighborhood for the past _____ months, in an effort to reduce gang-related activity and improve the quality of life in the area. This joint police/community effort was called the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative. In an effort to build upon and improve these types of community initiatives, please answer the following questions by circling the answer of your choice:

1. What level of awareness did you have with the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative?

Have no knowledge of it	Aware but not interested	Slightly aware	Highly aware	Highly aware and involved
----------------------------	-----------------------------	-------------------	-----------------	------------------------------

2. Please rate the level of involvement you may have had as a member of the community.

No involvement	Supported effort but not involved	Talked to friends & neighbors about it	Attended community meetings	Attended meetings & volunteered for clean-up efforts
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3. The Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative targeted a number of community issues in the area. Please indicate the level of impact on the listed issues over the past _____ months.
 - A. The Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative reduced visibility of gang activity in the area.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
----------------	-------	------------	----------	-------------------

 - B. The Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative reduced the frequency of drug selling in the area.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
----------------	-------	------------	----------	-------------------

 - C. The Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative reduced the amount of random gunfire in the area.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
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 - D. The Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative reduced the frequency of suspicious persons in the area.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
----------------	-------	------------	----------	-------------------

 - E. The Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative reduced the level of visible gang violence in the area.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
----------------	-------	------------	----------	-------------------

4. The operation of the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative during the last_____months contributed to making your neighborhood a safer place to live.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
5. I am satisfied with the way the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative has been operated as a means to reduce gang-related crime in my area.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
6. One of the goals of the Anti-Gang Initiative is to improve police community communication and community involvement. Please indicate the Police Department's performance in the following areas:
- A. The Police Department adequately informed community members about the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- B. The Police Department gave community members the opportunity to provide input at the start of the program.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- C. The Police Department provided opportunities for community input during the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- D. Community input was adequately used during the program.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- E. The Police Department provided the community with adequate information on how to report crimes/graffiti/suspicious persons/gang activity.
- Strongly Agree Agree, Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- F. The Police Department helped community members understand how to be involved in crime/violence reduction/crime prevention.
- Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

7. During the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative, over _____ police officers were specifically assigned to the area from the South Mountain Precinct. How would you rate the performance of officers you personally contacted or observed?

- A. The officers were fair to the community members during the program.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- B. The officers were courteous to community members during the program.
Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
- C. In general, how would you rate the level of sensitivity officers showed toward community needs?
Very good Good Uncertain Poor Very poor
- D. In general, how would you rate the officers level of initiative in addressing crime problems during the Strike Back Anti-Gang Initiative?
Very good Good Uncertain Poor Very poor
- E. Taking in account all the officers you personally observed during the _____ months of the Initiative, how would you rate your overall satisfaction with their performance?
Highly satisfied Satisfied Uncertain Not Satisfied Highly unsatisfied

8. Taking into account the entire _____ months the Anti-Gang Initiative operated in your area, how would you rate your overall satisfaction with the initiative?

- Highly satisfied Satisfied Uncertain Not Satisfied Highly unsatisfied

9. Can you think of any action or activity that was not part of the Anti-Gang Initiative that should have been, or do you have any suggestion or comments that will help improve future efforts?

14. Overall, the Police helped people in my neighborhood learn what we could do to make our lives safer.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know

During the Anti-Gang Initiative, numerous police officers worked in your area. Please tell us how you felt about this Police Presence.

15. The officers I personally talked with or saw seemed to be fair to all community members.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know

16. The officers I personally talked with or saw were courteous to people in the neighborhood.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know

17. The officers I personally talked with or saw were sensitive to special needs of our Neighborhood.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know

18. The officers I personally talked with or saw really tried hard to make the Anti-Gang Initiative work in my neighborhood.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know

Please tell us some general things about our effort and about yourself.

19. About how many times did you personally talk to or see an officer in your neighborhood since August 1996 when the Anti-Gang Initiative started?

No direct contact	1-3 times	4-6 times	7-9 times	10-12 times	13 or more
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20. If you think about the entire ten months of the Initiative, overall how satisfied are you with the performance of the Police?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Unsatisfied Unsatisfied Satisfied Strongly Satisfied Don't Know

21. If you think about the entire ten months of the Initiative, overall how satisfied are you that the program made a difference in reducing crime in your neighborhood?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
Strongly Unsatisfied Satisfied Strongly Satisfied Don't
Unsatisfied Know

22. Please circle the number of years you have lived in this neighborhood?

Less than 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 13-14 15-16 17 or
1 year years years years years years years years years more

23. Please circle your age grouping.

18 or 19-24 25-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66 or
younger years years years years years years years years years older


24. Please circle your ethnic heritage.



African- Hispanic White Asian American
American Indian

25. Please tell us if you are: 1: Female 2: Male

Do you have any suggestions about what the Police could do that would have made the Anti-Gang Initiative work better, or that would have made you personally feel better about the experience of having the program in your neighborhood?

HALLCRAFT VILLAS EAST I II + III





Definitions for Radio Call Data

(Not all of the following terms apply to your print out)

DATE: Date call was received by communications.

SHIFT: Work shift of police officer receiving the call

DAY: Day of week call was received (Sunday = 1, Monday = 2, Tuesday = 3, etc.).

PRECINCT: Precinct in which, call originated.

SQUAD: Squad area in which call originated.

BEAT: Heat area in which call originated.

GRID: Grid area in which call originated.

UNIT: (Callsign) Police officer -who took final disposition of the call

RADIO: Radio code describing the call (see attached radio code sheet).

DISP: Disposition assigned to the call

1. Arrest without a departmental report (DR.) completed (includes DUIs where an Alcohol Influence Report is made but no number is issued).
2. Used in all cases where a complainant is contacted, the call is canceled by the complainant prior to contact by an officer, or the call is turned over to another law enforcement agency or departmental bureau.
3. Unable to locate the reason for the call; there is no known complainant to be contacted; no police action required.
4. Given when a possession of marijuana (large or small) suspect is released pending issuance of a complaint
5. Detail completed. This disposition is not to be used in connection to **criminal** calls.
6. An, original DR made (with or without an arrest).
7. Reports other than a DR or Accident Report made.
8. Given any time an Accident Report is completed, even if a DR is also completed.
9. Citation issued and no other paperwork completed.
- S. A supplement to an original DR. made.

(Source: Operations Order D-B, revised 4/95)

RECV: Military time the call was received by dispatch.

DLAYHR: The delay time (in hours) measured from the received time in communications to the unit's start time on the call

DLAYMN: The delay time (in minutes) measured from the received time in communications to the unit's start time on the call

TRAVHR: The travel time (in hours) measured from the unit's start time on the call to the unit's arrival time at the scene.

TRAVMN: The travel time (in minutes) measured from the unit's start time on the call to the unit's arrival time at the scene.

RESPHR: The response time (in hours) measured from the received time in communications to the unit's arrival time at the scene. The response time includes delay and travel time.

RESPMN: The response time (in minutes) measured from the received time in communications to the unit's arrival time at the scene. The response time includes delay and travel time.

ELAPHRJ: The elapsed time (in hours) measured from the unit's start time on the call to the unit's stop time. The elapsed time includes the unit's travel time.

ELAPMN: The elapsed time (in minutes) measured from the unit's start time on the call to the unit's stop time. The elapsed time includes the unit's travel time.

ADDRESS: The address given on the final disposition of the call

PRTY: Priority assigned to the call by communications

1. Crimes in progress or just occurred. These would be of a serious nature or have a degree of immediate personal danger or **harm**.
2. Crimes of an urgent, but not life threatening nature.
3. Report calls that are not in progress.

(Source: Communications Bureau Manual, revised 9/94)

RESP: The response time (in minutes) measured from the received time in communications to the unit's arrival time at the scene. The response time includes delay and travel time.

DLAY: The delay time (in minutes) measured from the received time in communications to the unit's start time on the call

TRAVEL: The travel time (in minutes) measured from the unit's start time on the call to the unit's arrival time at the scene.

HLAP: The elapsed time (in minutes) measured from the unit's start time on the call to the unit's stop time. The elapsed time includes the unit's travel time.

CFS IN GRID AF38 1996 JAN-FEB 1997
 FOR OFFICER ANCICH 4013
 WHERE ADDRESS CONTAINS 44TH THRU 47TH
 AND IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 4000

13:13 Friday, April 4, 1997 9

----- ADDRESS=IS 46TH PL /E WOOD ST -----

DATEVAR	RCV	ADDRESS	RADIO	DISP	GRID
05MAR96	1544	IS 46TH PL /E WOOD ST	0311	2	AF38
12JAN97	2330	IS 46TH PL /E WOOD ST	0237M	6	AF38

N = 2

----- ADDRESS=4000 S 45TH ST -----

DATEVAR	RCV	ADDRESS	RADIO	DISP	GRID
07MAY96	1126	4000 S 45TH ST	0487S	6	AF38
07SEP96	1038	4000 S 45TH ST	0245	2	AF38

N = 2

----- ADDRESS=4001 S 44TH PL -----

DATEVAR	RCV	ADDRESS	RADIO	DISP	GRID
12JUL96	1831	4001 S 44TH PL	0415F	6	AF38
03NOV96	1604	4001 S 44TH PL	0907	7	AF38
18NOV96	324	4001 S 44TH PL	0239	6	AF38
30DEC96	2325	4001 S 44TH PL	0911H	2	AF38
27JAN97	1538	4001 S 44TH PL	0459	6	AF38
27FEB97	227	4001 S 44TH PL	09010	2	AF38
27FEB97	1056	4001 S 44TH PL	0418T	7	AF38

N = 7

----- ADDRESS=4001 S 44TH WY -----

DATEVAR	RCV	ADDRESS	RADIO	DISP	GRID
27OCT96	120	4001 S 44TH WY	0415E	2	AF38
01JAN97	2	4001 S 44TH WY	0900	2	AF38

Program name: PPD005.ADDVAR.SAS //RB

TOWNHOMES HOT-SPOTS

Villas East I-II-III				
4627	East	Pueblo	Av.	
4639	East	Pueblo		647 Activity
4635	East	Wood		Suspected Vandals
4645	East	Wood		Suspected Drug Activity
4647	East	Wood		
4707	East	Pueblo		Illegals
4713	East	Jones	Av.	
4717	East	Jones		Constant Foot Traffic
4719	East	Jones		Constant Foot Traffic
4723	East	Jones		Constant Foot Traffic
4212	South	47	St.	Illegals
4214	South	47	St.	Suspected 237N
4205	South	47	Plc.	Suspected Drug House Thefts in area
4225	South	47	Plc	647 Activity Numerous 239s And Gun Shots
Villas East IV				
4504	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug Activity Loneley Boy Residence Eddie Thompson B/M 11-1-73 526-43-8630
4508	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug Activity
4525	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug Activity
4527	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug Activity
4529	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug And Gang Activity
4005	South	44	Plc.	Possible Jamaican Residence
4034	South	44	Wy.	Constant Foot Traffic
4040 to 4050	South	44	Wy.	Constant Foot Traffic And Meeting Area
4046	South	44	Wy.	Complaints Of Gunshots and Gang Activity Several Subjects Seen Carrying Several Types Of Handguns And Rifles
Villas East V				
4434	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug House Crack
4438	East	Pueblo	Av.	Constant Foot Traffic 237M And 237N Crack Sales Suspected 487 Fs and Vandals Occupants said to be Making 236s To Neighbors
4465	East	Pueblo	Av.	Suspected Drug Activity
4483	East	Pueblo	Av.	Most calls for service 415-F and 240 Tenants complaining of constant noise and foot traffic
4407	East	Wood	St.	Suspected Crack House - Danny Boy Dealing
4475	East	Wood	St.	Constant Curfew Problem Tenants report Teenagers Loitering OUT Front Especially weekend Nights 2100 to 0300 Hrs Teenagers very vocal and Purposely Seek To Intimidate Other Residents
4476	East	Wood	St.	Suspected 237N Activity Tenant is Arthur Oliver who was Arrested at and Evicted From 4529 E Pueblo
4479	East	Wood	St.	237M Activity, Related to 4476 E. Wood.
4401	East	Riverside	St.	Constant Foot Traffic And Loud Parties
4409	East	Riverside	St.	237N Activity
4425	East	Riverside	St.	237M Activity

TOWNHOMES VACANCY LIST

VILLAS EAST 1,2,3	VILLAS EAST 4	VILLAS EAST 5
4602 E. Southgate Ave.	4472 E. Pueblo Ave.	4410 E. Pueblo Ave.
4603 E. Riverside St.	4474 E. Pueblo Ave.	4423 E. Pueblo Ave.
4608 E. Broadway Rd.	4475 E. Wood St.	4430 E. Pueblo Ave.
4609 E. Southgate Ave.	4486 E. Pueblo Ave.	4434 E. Pueblo Ave.
4612 E. Broadway Rd.	4501 E. Wood St.	4445 E. Pueblo Ave.
4616 E. Broadway Rd.	4506 E. Pueblo Ave.	4454 E. Pueblo Ave.
4617 E. Broadway Rd.	4508 E. Wood St.	4406 E. Wood St.
4619 E. Pueblo Ave.	4510 E. Pueblo Ave.	4407 E. Wood St.
4621 E. Wood St.	4513 E. Pueblo Ave.	4425 E. Wood St.
4621 E. Jones Ave.	4513 E. Riverside St.	4445 E. Wood St.
4622 E. Pueblo Ave.	4517 E. Wood St.	4448 E. Wood St.
4623 E. Wood St.	4523 E. Pueblo Ave.	4400 E. Riverside St.
4624 E. Wood St.	4524 E. Wood St.	4407 E. Riverside St.
4626 E. Pueblo Ave.	4526 E. Pueblo Ave.	4408 E. Broadway Rd.
4628 E. Wood St.	4528 E. Riverside St.	4001 S. 44 St.
4628 E. Pueblo Ave.	4005 S. 44 Wy.	4007 S. 44 St.
4630 E. Southgate Ave.	4017 S. 44 Wy.	4021 S. 44 St.
4631 E. Pueblo Ave.	4023 S. 44 Wy.	4024 S. 44 St.
4631 E. Southgate Ave.	4025 S. 44 Wy.	4026 S. 44 St.
4632 E. Wood St.	4039 S. 44 Wy.	4022 S. 44 Pl.
4632 E. Southgate Ave.	4007 S. 45 St.	4023 S. 44 Pl.
4633 E. Pueblo Ave	4008 S. 45 St.	4024 S. 44 pl.
4634 E. Wood St.	4017 S. 45 St.	4002 S. 44 Wy.
4642 E. Pueblo Ave.	4021 S. 45 St.	4016 S. 44 Wy.
4643 E. Pueblo Ave.	4030 S. 45 St.	4038 S. 44 Wy.
4644 E. Pueblo Ave.	4006 S. 45 Pl.	4042 S. 44 Wy.
4645 E. Wood St.	4024 S. 45 Pl.	4048 S. 44 Wy.
4705 E. Jones Ave.		4050 S. 44 Wy.
4716 E. Broadway Rd.		
4236 S. 46 Pl.		
4240 S. 46 Pl.		
4242 S. 46 Pl.		
4214 S. 47 St.		
4201 s. 47 Pl.		
4221 S. 47 Pl.		

TOWNHOME CLEAN-UP PROPERTIES

LOCATION

PROBLEM

4207 S. 47 Place	Vacant/Fence/Garbage/Unsecured Closet
4209 S. 47 Place	Vacant/Burnt out yard
4211 S. 47 Place	Vacant/Fenced/Boarded/Garbage
4721 E. Jones	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
4713 E. Jones	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
Home just South of 4713 E. Jones	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
4709 E. Jones	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
4621 E. Broadway Road	Vacant/Major Cleanup - Auto Parts
4605 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Cleaned/Fence
4612 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Cleanup
4606 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Cleanup
4220 S. 46 Place	Cleanup/Not Vacant
4619 E. Southgate	Cleanup Yard/Vacant
4612 E. Southgate	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
Property just west of 4612 E. Southgate	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
4603 E. Jones	Vacant/Cleanup Yard
4642 E. Jones	Vacant/Needs Boarded Shed
4212 S. 47 St.	Vacant/No Fence/Cleaned
4625 E. Wood St.	Vacant/Boarded and Cleaned
4647 E. Wood St.	Vacant/Cleaned
4513 E. Riverside	Vacant/Boarded Up/Clean Yard
4513 E. Wood St.	Vacant/Boarded Up/Yard Cleaned

4454 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Burned/Trash
4447 E. Broadway Rd.	Vacant/Reboarded
4437 E. Broadway Rd.	Vacant/Gate/Trash.
4434 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Trash/____Front Yard (Jefferson Bigbee)
	Water/Ruth. L-Wells
4432 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Boarded Up/Needs Boards
4436 E. Pueblo	Vacant/Boards/Clean
4419 E. Wood	Vacant/Boarded
4001 S. 44 St.	Vacant/Boarded
4021 S. 44 Place	Vacant/Cleanup/Boarded
4036 S. 44 Way	Vacant/Boarded/Cleaned
4048 S. 44 Way	Vacant/Fence/Cleanup
4476 E. Wood	Vacant/Cleanup/Courtyard
4007 S. 45 St.	Vacant/Cleanup/Courtyard

SOUTH MOUNTAIN PRECINCT

TOWNHOMES

NO TRESPASSING LOG

NAME	:R/S/DOB	:LOCATION	:DATE/TIME	:OFFICER
ACCORD, JESON	:B/M 101979	:4500 E SOUTHGATE	:022297/2130	:5602
ADAMS, RICHARD JOSEPH	:B/M 071763	:4300 S 45 ST	:021197/2330	:5648
ARMOUR, JAIMASON M	:B/M 061472	:4700 E PUEBLO	:021197/2200	:5648
BECERRA, NICHOLAS PINEDA	:H/M 042473	:4400 E WOOD	:022497/1600	:5602
BERRYMAN, DAN BERRY	:B/M 041253	:4717 E JONES	:021197/2220	:5648
BROOKS, DONALD ALLEN	:B/M 120561	:4500 E RIVERSIDE	:022397/2230	:5648
BRYANT, ANTHONY JEROME	:B/M101663	:4400 E WOOD	:022397/2130	:4635
CARSON, AARON CHRISTOPHER	:B/M 032178	:4635 E WOOD	:022197/1830	:5184
COLEMAN, CLIFFORD LEE	:B/M 030859	:4500 E WOOD	:022297/1505	:4801
COLEMAN, LEONARD ALEXANDER	:B/M 080471	:46PL- PUEBLO	:022197/1825	:5184
CRAIG, MICHAEL LEE	:B/M 051264	:4300 S 47TH PL	:022197/2100	:5602
CROSS, FRANKLIN	:B/M 070952	:4700 E RIVERSIDE	:022697/1800	:5461
ELLIS, MARCUS L.	:B/M 121073	:4500 E RIVERSIDE	:022297/2040	:5648
FRANKLIN, ORVELL	:B/M 011250	:4200 S 47 ST	:022197/1840	:5184
FRENCH, MARK ANTHONY	:B/M 072382	:4600 E RIVERSIDE	:022197/2124	:5648
GALINDO, CHARLES	:H/M 022856	:4637 E WOOD	:022197/1730	:5648
GALLIGAN, MICHAEL SCOTT	:W/M 090769	:4400 E WOOD	:022497/2300	:5602
HABEEL, NAIM BASIM	:B/M 112179	:4500 E WOOD	:022297/0835	:4801
HAMPTON, VIRGIL R.	:B/M 082772	:4400 E RIVERSIDE	:021397/2330	:2868
HOOKS, TININKA	:B/F 050879	:4400 E PUEBLO	:022397/2130	:4635
HOWARD, MICHAEL D.	:B/M 052376	:4400 E PUEBLO	:021197/2330	:5648
JARRETT, TORRON DEON	:B/M 110770	:4400 E RIVERSIDE	:021397/2330	:2868
JEFFRIES, DANIELLE	:B/F 082376	:4500 E RIVERSIDE	:022697/2130	:4635
JOHNSON, DEREK LAMAR	:B/M 063077	:4400 E. WOOD	:012297/1300	:5461
LEWIS, LARTON	:W/M 071566	:4700 E JONES	:012297/1715	:5184
LUCKY, TOMA	:B/M 031973	:4600 E WOOD	:022297/1730	:5648
MANNING, CHRISTOPHER R.	:B/M 041562	:4600 E RIVERSIDE	:022397/1324	:3102 3517
MANNING, KEVIN M.	:B/M 011466	:4400 E JONES (EAST)	:022397/2100	:5602
MAXWELL, JOHN RAY	:B/M 060977	:4400 E RIVERSIDE	:021397/2330	:2868
MONROE, MATTHEW DESHAWN	:B/M 082779	:4471 E WOOD (WEST)	:022397/2130	:5648
MOORE, GRECIAN	:B/M 092274	:4500 E SOUTHGATE	:022297/2100	:5602
NORMAN, GENE MYERS	:B/M 061160	:4700 E BROADWAY	:022597/2245	:5602
NEWTON, CHARLES SR.	:B/M 102450	:4006 S 45 ST (EAST)	:022397/2300	:5648
PINNELL, WILLIAM JAMES	:W/M 120757	:4400 E JONES	:021497/1805	:5184
RICHARDS, HUEY PAUL	:B/M 101454	:4717 E JONES	:012197/1658	:5461
RIDLEY, DANNY	:B/M 022169	:4500 E S'GATE (EAST SIDE)	:022297/2130	:5648
ROJAS, EDUARDO OSORIO	:H/M 031852	:4605 E JONES	:022397/1103	:5039
RUSSELL, JEWELL DAVID	:B/M 031662	:4015 S 45 ST	:021397/2345	:2868
RYDER, BERNARD F.	:B/M 030947	:4600 E WOOD	:022197/1750	:5461
SANCHEZ, BENJAMIN	:H/M 020381	:4400 E WOOD	:022297/2009	:5461
SCHMIDT, JENNIFER ANN	:W/F 031366	:4647 E WOOD	:022197/1730	:5648
SCOTT, CALVIN JR.	:B/M 021374	:4400 E RIVERSIDE	:021397/2330	:2868
SIMMONDS, RONALD MARK	:B/M 012679	:4438 E PUEBLO	:022497/1145	:4720
SLEDGE, JOE HENRY	:B/M 070771	:4716 E PUEBLO :	:012297/2245	:5184
SMITH, ALEX	:B/M 051970	:4015 S 45 ST	:021397/2345	:2868
SMITH, PERCY LEE	:B/M 092757	:4200 S 47 ST	:022197/1840	:5184
SOLOMON, RUFUS J.	:B/M 020356	:4005 S 44ST	:022197/2345	:5648
STEWART, BRUCE ERIC	:B/M 060662	:4717 E JONES (WEST)	:022397/2030	:2868
STEWART, GLEN L. "LAY LOW"	:B/M 021569	:4600 E WOOD (WEST)	:022397/2030	:4635
STEVENSON, RAY	:B/M112755	:4500 E RIVERSIDE	:022297/1700	:5461

