

The Chula Vista Residential Burglary Reduction Project

Summary

Scanning

Although residential burglary rates had declined in Chula Vista in the mid- 1990s, the number of burglaries was still unacceptably high in 1996, when more than 900 of our 52,000 households were victimized. During this same period, the city experienced a series of "hot prowls" that raised fear levels in the community. A 1997 resident survey reinforced the need to focus on residential burglary: 82% of respondents indicated that they were concerned about burglary, making it the second-highest ranked crime or disorder problem in the city after the problem of speeding vehicles. In 1997, burglaries in Chula Vista began to rise again, after four straight years of declines. More than 30,000 new housing units were scheduled to be built in Chula Vista over the next 20 years, and it was imperative that potential buyers and builders saw Chula Vista neighborhoods as safe places to live.

Analysis

The police department undertook an extensive study of the factors that attracted burglars to specific homes, as well as those protective devices that were most effective at preventing burglaries. Researchers and sworn police staff interviewed more than 300 victims and suspects, conducted more than 100 street-view environmental assessments, and reviewed over 1000 incident reports of burglaries committed against single-family homes. Key findings from the analysis phase included:

- Doors without deadbolt locks were targeted
- Windows with single panes were targeted
- Windows with simple stock latches were easily defeated
- Sliding glass doors without specialized pin locks were easily rocked off their tracks
- Almost all targeted properties had numerous hidden points of entry concealed by high shrubbery or solid fencing

Response

Chula Vista negotiated with the five major home developers in the city to make small, but significant, design changes to address the key risk factors and protective elements for residential burglary identified in the analysis phase. These changes were made in every new home built in the city after February 1999. Developers also agreed to distribute anti-burglary literature tailored to Chula Vista residents at the point of sale.

Assessment

Residential burglaries in Chula Vista dropped 25% during the two years after the target hardened homes were built, and residential burglaries dropped approximately 50% in the target neighborhoods during this time period. As a result, we estimate that over 196 burglaries have been prevented since 1999, saving Chula Vista residents over \$400,000 and the police department more than 500 hours of staff time.

SCANNING

Like many cities across the country, Chula Vista experienced slowly declining residential burglary rates in the mid-1990s. However, the number of burglaries was still felt to be unacceptably high in 1996, when more than 900 of our 52,000 households were victimized. During this same period, the city experienced a series of "hot prowls" -burglaries committed while the residents were home - that raised fear levels in the community. The department's Street Team, a unit dedicated to addressing emerging problems, was assigned to the hot prowl series, but was unable to apprehend the perpetrator(s). Instead, they were confronted with a number of very frightened victims.

A 1997 resident survey reinforced the need to focus on residential burglary. Eightytwo percent of respondents indicated that they were concerned about burglary, making it the second-highest ranked crime or disorder problem in the city after the problem of speeding vehicles. Burglaries in the city also began to rise in 1997, after four straight years of declines.

The problem of residential burglary was, and continues to be, a particularly compelling one for Chula Vista. The city is a largely residential community¹. In the mid1990s it had phenomenal opportunities for residential expansion. More than 30,600 new housing units were scheduled to be built in Chula Vista between the late 1990s and 2015. For this vision to be realized, it was imperative that potential buyers and builders felt Chula Vista neighborhoods were safe places to live.

¹Chula Vista has significantly fewer jobs per housing unit than both its neighboring jurisdictions (National City, the city of San Diego, and San Diego County). Additionally, more than 85% of the land designated as urban space in Chula Vista is set aside for residential developments.

With these issues in mind, the police department began work on what ultimately became a far-reaching problem-solving effort to reduce residential burglary rates over the next 20 years.

ANALYSIS

We began the analysis phase of the project by attempting to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of the problem. However, the data necessary to fully analyze burglary patterns and identify effective solutions was not available in existing police reports. Further, staffing constraints limited the amount of research that could be done on the exact nature of the residential burglary problem in Chula Vista.

In late 1998, we received funds from a COPS Office problem-solving grant that enabled us to conduct an in-depth analysis of Chula Vista's burglary problem. Researchers hired with the grant found devoted more than a thousand hours to determining with scientific accuracy why some homes were more vulnerable to burglary than others. We began our search for effective ways of preventing burglary by reviewing the criminal justice literature and examining over 1,000 incident reports.

Ultimately, we focused our report review efforts on 569 single-detached homes that had been burglarized or an attempt had been made to do so. A number of the burglary case reports had to be reviewed by hand to determine such factors as method of entry, which was sometimes only captured in the narrative section of the crime reports. A basic profile of the "successful burglary" emerged: the point of entry was most frequently a door (52%) or a window (44%) that was generally out of sight from the street and located at the back or side of the home (65% of the points of entry were at the back or side of the house). The most frequent way that burglars defeated locked doors was to pry them open using tools such as

screwdrivers or crowbars (19% of the door-entry cases). In the case of sliding glass doors, burglars easily lifted them off their tracks if they did not pry them open (12% of the doorentry cases). Simply finding an unlocked or open door proved helpful to burglars in 11% of the cases. Another relatively frequent and highly preventable type of burglary was the open garage door burglary, which accounted for 12% of all incidents studied.

Burglars gained access through windows in much the same way they gained access through doors. The method employed most often was to force a latched window open by prying with a tool (24%). In 17% of the cases, suspects broke a window to gain entry, apparently without regard for the noise it might cause or the attention it might attract from neighbors.

To add to our understanding of the problem, we interviewed more than 300 burglary victims and suspects. By collecting additional information about specific crime prevention measures in place at victimized locations, we were able to compare the relative effectiveness of these measures by contrasting those measures in place in attempted burglaries (which accounted for 11% of all incidents) with those in place during "successful burglaries." This critical information was not captured in routine incident reports.

From victim interviews, we learned that in 87% of the break-ins that occurred when intruders defeated locked doors with tools such as screwdrivers or crowbars, the burglars targeted "the one door that had no deadbolt lock." Victim reports also indicated that burglars had an easier time entering through sliding glass doors that did not have channel locks or slide bolts. Another major finding from the victim interviews was that windows with simple stock latches were easily pried open, whereas those with locks were not. Perhaps even more important was the finding from the victim interviews that not one burglar attempted to break a double-pane window during the course of a successful or attempted burglary.

We also learned what prevention techniques seemed to have little effect on whether a burglary would be successful. Methods found to have relatively low effectiveness included: sliding glass door *braces*, such as wooden dowels, as opposed to sliding door channel or pin locks; deadbolts installed in the front door only; and outdoor lights on dusk-to-dawn timers².

According to victim interviews, the problem of leaving doors unlocked (10% of dooretry cases) was largely due to forgetfulness. Interviews with burglars confirmed that locked doors were among their greatest deterrents; few preferred to punch or pick door locks (4%); and less than 1% chose to defeat channel locks on sliding glass doors. As might be expected, during the interviews, homeowners also expressed an interest in learning more about how to protect their homes against burglars.

We also sought to more ftily understand and quantify the harms experienced by burglary victims. We calculated average loss figures for residential burglaries from incident reports, and found that in 1998 the typical victim lost just over \$2,000. Approximately 26% of burglaries yielded more than \$5,000 worth of property, while another 37% of victims estimated their losses at between \$ 1,000 and \$5,000. The remaining 3 7% of victims lost less then \$ 1,000. Generally, items stolen were uninsured or underinsured, and had not been engraved with identifying names or numbers.

In reviewing reports, we determined that burglars typically ransacked or vandalized at least 25% of the homes they burglarized in Chula Vista. Discussions with victims also reinforced to us the psychological impact of residential burglary. Although it is "merely" a property crime, it is a devastating crimes to its victims. Persons whose homes have been entered by strangers and had items stolen, have indicated that the crime most closely

²The finding regarding the ineffectiveness of outdoor timer lights was supported by the residential burglary literature (Wright, Logie & Decker, 1995).

resembles rape. Victims feel invaded and unsafe in a way not experienced by victims of car theft or petty larceny.

We reviewed the ways the department had responded to the problem of residential burglary in the past. In addition to routinely investigating burglaries that met the criteria for follow-up investigation, we encouraged community members to participate in Neighborhood Watch, and offered residents generic crime prevention tips developed by the National Crime Prevention Council under the McGruff program. In the mid- 1990s, the department also employed one half-time staff person who was dedicated to crime prevention. That person was responsible for crime prevention efforts aimed at reducing all types of crime, however. As a result, the amount of time this person could spend on reducing burglary rates was relatively low.

We also took a look at the effectiveness of the responses to burglary in place in our community at the time. A review of residential burglary clearance rates from 1994 to 1996 indicated they averaged 18%-20% in Chula Vista. While these rates were higher than the national average of the time for cities our size (13.5%), we felt that more could be done to prevent a significant chunk of the burglaries from occurring in the first place. As mentioned earlier, burglary rates had declined during the mid- 1990s, mirroring the pattern experienced by many agencies, but they had also begun to creep back up in Chula Vista in 1997.

Finally, to further enhance our understanding of why certain properties attracted burglars in the first place, we conducted more than 100 street-view environmental assessments of burglarized properties. One of the most important findings of this portion of the project was that in 94% of the burglaries, any point of entry other than the front door would have been hidden from the street, either by high or overgrown shrubbery or by solid wood fencing. This condition most certainly aided burglars by providing the necessary

privacy and time needed to break into these homes unseen from the street or by neighbors, as it was found in 75% of the "successful" burglaries as opposed to 25% of the attempted burglary cases. Solid wood fencing, block walls, and gates also appeared to facilitate successful burglaries; 73% of successfully burglarized homes had this feature, while only 26% of attempted burglary residences did.

Taken together, the data from all of the above sources revealed significant patterns of target selection, methods of entry, and burglar deterrence. Our research also led us to the conclusion that we could take steps to significantly reduce the ability of offenders to commit opportunistic burglaries.

RESPONSE

Based on our findings from the analysis phase of the project, we subsequently developed an array of solid, practical solutions that resulted in reductions in burglary rates. These responses relied heavily on crime prevention through environmental design principles, and, to a lesser extent, public education efforts.

Through our earlier research, we knew that environmental design changes would be among the most effective ways of preventing residential burglaries because they did not rely on behavioral changes of victims or the increased presence of police. Environmental protections were thought to be especially appropriate for Chula Vista, which lacked a strong Neighborhood Watch program, particularly in newer residential areas, due to a lack of resident interest and fiscal support for the program. Additionally, environmental changes were considered to be among the least expensive ways of protecting vulnerable locations and people over the long term.

We realized that if we could somehow negotiate built-in burglary prevention features for new homes, more than 36% of all Chula Vista housing stock would have proven anti-

3 burglM devices in place by 2015. Such an unprecedented and comprehensive initiative would likely help keep burglary rates relatively low for years to come in the face of economic declines, increases in drug use, and other factors relating to burglary rates that inevitably occur over time.

In order to negotiate such changes, the police department needed to develop a mutually beneficial, collaborative relationship with the new housing development and building industry. Project staff knew it would be of critical importance to involve the new home industry in the development and implementation of effective burglary prevention measures, because it would help achieve buy-in to the effort. In addition, the police department sought to tap into the expertise of people knowledgeable in the field of new home design and construction to help develop innovative, cost-effective ways of target-hardening new homes. Finally, we sought to share ownership of the problem of residential burglary with the homebuilding industry, which has both financial incentives and a responsibility to design homes that are safe based on what we know about burglary prevention.

Project staff decided to approach home development executives, rather than home builders, about participating in the effort. Since several builders contract with each developer, involving home developers up front would attain better coverage of the industry in less time. Likewise, executives at the highest decision making levels were best positioned to:

³ After analyzing the problem of residential burglaries in Chula Vista, it became clear that we could have the most impact on the problem by focusing on changing the construction standards for new homes, since they would eventually constitute such a large portion of Chula Vista's housing stock. Retrofitting older homes with effective environmental deterrents identified in the analysis phase, particularly proposed changes in window standards, would have been cost-prohibitive.

make and expedite broad-based decisions in all areas of interest to the project - home building, landscaping, common areas, and community structure.

New community development was being conducted by five primary developers in Chula Vista in 1998. Executives from each company were personally invited to attend an individual introductory meeting, at which they were provided with the key findings of the analysis phase of the project regarding residential burglary deterrents specific to Chula Vista. At these meetings, the police department presented a number of detailed recommendations on ways of target-hardening new homes. These recommendations included: Upgrading window locks and installing only double pane glass; Installing on all windows some form of automatic locking mechanism that engaged as the windows closed; Installing deadbolt locks on all side and rear standard home doors; Installing keyed channel locks or slide bolts on all sliding glass doors; Providing new homeowners with anti-burglary landscaping options and a list of local landscape architects who specialized in anti-burglary landscaping methods; Installing see-through fences to eliminate fences as hiding places for burglars; Tasking newly created homeowners' associations with the responsibility of forming and maintaining Neighborhood Watch programs.

At the meetings, developers were asked to be our partners in the effort and encouraged to generate additional ideas regarding burglary prevention. More specifically, they were tasked with developing a broad range of ideas on hardware, building design methods, environmental design, or other ideas they thought might work well to (1) discourage burglars from selecting their new homes, and (2) stop burglars who were looking

for easy points of entry into new homes. Finally, developers were asked to make calculated estimates of the costs associated with these ideas and the lead-time required for implementation. Project staff arranged a series of follow-up brainstorming meetings with developers to discuss in detail their findings and ideas, and reach agreements on changes that could be implemented.

Ultimately, the developers agreed to make six modifications to new homes as part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Three of the modifications target-hardened homes. These changes included installing deadbolt door locks on vulnerable garage service doors, using only windows that meet strict forced-entry resistance standards, and installing pin locks on all sliding glass doors to prevent prying or rocking doors off their tracks. Developers also agreed to distribute a safety and security brochure, jointly created by developers and police department personnel, that spelled out additional ways of preventing burglary, based on earlier findings from the project. Garage burglaries were addressed in the brochure, which warned residents to close their garage doors even when they were only away for a few minutes. Developers also required that garage doors be kept shut per homeowner association rules. Additionally, developers agreed to distribute information on anti-burglary landscape ideas, and local landscape designers and contractors familiar with anti-burglary landscape techniques. This information was to be given to new homeowners at the point of sale [see Appendix for a sample brochure]. Finally, developers agreed to task each newly created Homeowner's Association with setting up and maintaining a permanent Neighborhood Watch Program.

Possibly the most important modification - upgraded windows - was the most difficult to negotiate. Sgt. Hardman sensed a reluctance on the part of one of the five developers to upgrade the windows on his homes so that they would be self-locking.

Frustrated by the developer's reluctance, Sgt. Hardman called another contact in the building industry who suggested he speak directly with a window manufacturer about the feasibility of self-locking windows. Because the window manufacturer did not service the construction industry in the San Diego area and only produced windows for a very different type of home market, project staff felt his advice would be unbiased. Sgt. Hardman spent an afternoon with the window manufacturer, and learned that the best and most cost-effective windows to recommend were those with the American Architectural Manufacturer's Association (AAMA) seal. The AAMA seal meant the windows could withstand 150 pounds of pressure. Armed with new technical knowledge about forced-entry standards and the cost of AAMA approved windows (approximately \$40 per house), Sgt. Hardman was able to discuss the finer points of window issues with the reluctant developer, and subsequently convinced him to agree to the AAMA-approved windows. Ironically, the AAMA-approved windows were a much higher grade of window than the type Sgt. Hardman had originally proposed and the developer had initially resisted.

We were unable to negotiate several changes with the developers, however. These included the use of automatically locking windows, which raised liability concerns among the developers, particularly with regard to egress in the event of a fire. Another proposed change that was not adopted was the use of see-through fencing. The developers felt that new home buyers seeking privacy would not be interested in see-through fencing, despite its ability to deter burglars.

We also considered seeking funding from Home Depot for upgrades to older homes, and looked into securing insurance rebates for homeowners who made the new construction CPTED changes to older homes. At one point, we considered requiring older homes to undergo the new home upgrades as part of the sales process to new owners. Ultimately, due

to the costs associated with the above responses, we implemented a modified version of Mesa's Crime-Free Multi Housing program in the Western section of Chula Vista to shore up protections for existing homes.

ASSESSMENT

Although the long-term impact of the anti-burglary project will not be felt for some time, the initial results are very promising. Residential burglary rates in Chula Vista dropped 29% in 1999, the first year after the developers signed the MOU. Other neighboring jurisdictions also experienced declines in burglary, but the declines were significantly below those achieved in Chula Vista. Burglaries declined 13% in National City, which borders Chula Vista to the North, and 16% in the City of San Diego, which actually borders Chula Vista to the South.

Because residential burglaries crept back up 4% in Chula Vista in 2000, we sought to understand why this might be the case. First we identified a jurisdiction in San Diego County - San Marcos - that had experienced similar explosive rates of growth, hoping that it would provide a meaningful natural comparison with Chula Vista. Located in the Northern section of the county, San Marcos also experienced a tremendous construction boom in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of housing units in San Marcos increased 24%; during the same time period, the number of housing units in Chula Vista increased nearly 20%. In addition, the median income of San Marcos residents is approximately \$40,000; Chula Vista's is \$42,500.

In reviewing burglary rates in San Marcos, we found that that city experienced no reductions in 1999, and an increase of 11 % in 2000. Looking at the two-year period from

1999 through 2000, residential burglaries increased 12% in San Marcos, while they decreased by 25% in Chula Vista.

Adding strength to the conclusion that the anti-burglary project in Chula Vista hit its mark are the varying burglary rates for the three individual policing sectors in Chula Vista. Sectors I and 2, located in the Northwest and Southwest portions of the city, are comprised of primarily older, established neighborhoods. Sector 3, which encompasses the entire Eastern portion of the city, is made up of mostly contemporary master planned communities~. Interestingly enough, while the number of burglaries in Sectors I and 2 increased 12% and 13% respectively, in the year 2000, the number of burglaries in Sector 3 - the area that was targeted by the anti-burglary project - fell 9%. Looking at the two-year period from 1999 through 2000, residential burgiga rates dropped gpproximately 50% in Sector 3. We do not believe burglaries have been displaced from Sector 3 to Sectors I and 2. We consulted with a national residential burglary expert about the potential for displacement; she indicated that spatial displacement of residential burglary is not typically seen, since the offenders and victims are not both mobile. Additionally, the portions of Sectors I and 2 that have higher burglary rates are set off from Sector 3 by a North-South Interstate Highway (1 -805).

We sought to provide further evidence of the impact of this project by comparing burglary rates between one swath of homes built almost completely after February 1999 with another similar group of homes built both before and after February 1999. During the first quarter of 200 1, the "new" home group had a burglary rate of .2 per thousand persons, compared to a burglary rate of .48 per thousand persons for the "mixed age" home group.⁵ in

⁴ Sector 3 is a mix of homes built predominantly after 1980. It includes most of the homes in Chula Vista built after the developers agreed to change their home designs in 1999. ⁵ This burglary rate comparison was not done for the year 2000 because families continually moved into the "new" home census tracts; as a result, population figures for these neighborhoods changed virtually every

other words, a new home had less than half the burglary rate of a home in the adjacent mixed age neighborhoods, despite the fact that a number of the homes in the mixed aged neighborhoods were built just prior to the February 1999 developer agreement. (See map in Appendix.)

The evidence of impact based on an anticipated reduction in window and side door entries is mixed. The number of window burglaries as a ratio of total burglaries in 2000 is essentially the same for the new home areas and the mixed age home areas. Side door entries, however, were significantly reduced in the new home areas in 2000. %ile there were nine side door burglaries in the mixed age neighborhoods in the first quarter of 2001, there were no side door burglaries in the new home areas. (See map in Appendix.)

Based on the data on burglary reductions, it is likely that more than 196 burglaries have been prevented in Chula Vista since the developers implemented the MOU. Based on average 1998 residential burglary loss figures, we estimate that residents of Chula Vista as a whole have not sustained expected losses of more than \$413,756 during this period. Additionally, 196 families have been spared the pain of losing irreplaceable valuables with sentimental value, and the enhanced levels of fear that typically accompany burglary victimization.

The City of Chula Vista has also experienced significant savings from the burglary prevention project, both in terms of staff time and salary expenses. A typical burglary report, which is usually handled by community service officers (CSOs), takes an average of two hours to complete. As a result, we believe the burglary project has saved 392 hours of CSO time, which equates to more than \$7,840 in salary and benefits costs. Along the same vein,

month. Year 2000 population figures were used to calculate first quarter 2001 burglary rates, which provided us with a conservative estimate of the differences in rates between the "new" and "mixed age" homes.

we conservatively estimate the project has saved 113 hours of investigative time, or at least \$3,595 in agent salary and benefits. The saved CSO and investigative time can now be dedicated to other pressing crimes affecting the City of Chula Vista.

The participating new home developers received positive public recognition for their efforts to improve the safety and security of all future homes built in Chula Vista. At the February 16, 1999, signing ceremony of the MOU, public thanks and a Certificate of Recognition were presented to developers by the chief of police and City Council. The accolades received by the developers came at little expense. For example, forced entryresistant window pins that became standard in new construction as a result of the MOU cost about \$2 each. Clearly, the project was a win for the new home industry, which was able to sell buyers on the cost-effective, built-in security measures in their newly designed homes.

The specific aim of the burglary prevention project was to reduce residential burglary levels in Chula Vista. On behalf of the large number of new homes and families that will be added to our community in the next 15 years, we sought ways of meeting their needs with dollar-stretching preventive measures. Without a doubt, all stakeholders in the burglary problem benefited from the project - new home buyers, community members at large, developers, and city agencies. The use of a collaborative problem-solving model led to a winwin situation that will continue to provide a payoff for all members of the Chula Vista community well into the 21 st century.

Agency and Officer Information

This problem-solving initiative was pursued primarily by one sergeant, Dan Hardman, and two researchers hired by the police department under the problem-solving grant. Sgt. Hardman had received some training in problem solving while pursuing his

bachelor's degree in criminal justice, and had also received information on problem solving during several department presentations on the Concept. Problem-oriented policing issues were discussed during his promotion process and applicants were evaluated on their abilities to address these issues. Project staff also referred to the publication Problem-Solving Tips to help implement this problem-solving project.

The department committed 90% of Sgt. Hardman's time for over a year to work on this project. In addition, the department used approximately \$60,000 from the U.S. Department of Justice grant to hire part-time researchers and contract with SANDAG (San Diego Association of Governments) to conduct offender interviews.

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Appendix

Developer Brochure

First Quarter 2001 Residential Burglary Chart

First Quarter 2001 Residential Burglary Map

Calendar Year 2000 Side Door Entries Map

"Police, Developers Join to Combat Burglaries," San Diego Business Journal, April 12, 1999

"They'll Build Safety into New Homes," San Diego Union Tribune, March 26, 1999

More things YOU can do ... with Landscaping...

Think about creating a landscape that is more than just beautiful and affordable. Use landscaping techniques that discourage burglars.

Consider low growing shrubbery. Plant shrubbery that can be kept trimmed down to 3 feet.

Use trees that can be kept bottom-trimmed up to 6 feet.

Consider using thorny plants or Window boxes under windows.

Keep tall, dense shrubbery away from entrances.

Install gate locks

Consider motion detector lights

Use timers for irrigation systems and for landscape lighting.

Choose a landscape architect, designer or contractor familiar with anti-burglary landscape concepts.

Additionally, here are 4 Tips from the California Landscape Contractors Association to think about before you hire a landscape contractor.

Use only licensed landscape contractors.

Check references and ask to visit the properties.

Don't get lured into "lowest price" hiring.

Look for a 1-year guarantee on the irrigation system and trees.

Crime Prevention tips from

OTAY RANCH
and the
CHULA VISTA
POLICE DEPARTMENT

For more information,
contact:

Chula Vista Police
Department
Crime Prevention Unit

(619) 691-5127

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	<p>A Message from Chula Vista's Chief of Police</p> <p>Welcome! We're happy to have you here and we're sure you'll feel at home in our beautiful city. Crime is down again this year, as it has been for the past several years especially crime against homeowners.</p> <p>We think this is partly because our homeowners are more aware - and partly because of new features being offered by innovative homebuilders like yours.</p> <p>We want you to continue to feel safe in your new home, so here are a few facts.</p> <p>All the evidence tells us that burglars look for..</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o A home that seems to be unoccupied o A hidden point of entry, like a back window o A convenient place to hide, like tall shrubbery o An open window or unlocked door, o A door without a deadbolt lock that can be easily pried open o A sliding glass door with no lock on the channel o An open overhead garage door with an unattended garage 	<p>Safety Features Added To Your New Home</p> <p>Homebuilders in, Otay Ranch have already put you on the right road by adding protections to your new home which include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Windows that meet tough forced entry standards o A deadbolt lock on the side garage service door o Keyed channel locks on sliding glass doors. <p>The Otay Ranch Company has also made arrangements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Neighborhood Watch programs are in your community. Watch for 	<p>Additional Safety Tips</p> <p>Get to know your neighbors. Also your new home has numerous protections like window and door locks Be consistent about using them!</p> <p>When you're away, make your home seem occupied</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Leave a radio playing, preferably on a talk show station. o Use timers to turn indoor lights on and off at different times. o Arrange to have mail, newspapers and deliveries stopped or picked up.
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As you settle into your new home, please take a few minutes to read the helpful tips provided in this brochure. There are many simple suggestions provided to add to the safety of your home and your surrounding neighborhood. Again, welcome to the City of Chula Vista. We certainly hope you enjoy your new home."

Rick Emerson
Chula Vista Chief of Police

scheduled programs.

Also, don't leave the overhead garage door open if you're not there even for a few minutes! Tools, bicycles and golf clubs are easily taken this way!

Residential Burglaries: January-March 2001

Mixed Age Home Area	Census Tract	Population	Number of Burglaries	Burglary Rate
	134.12	5,112	5	
	134.13	8,339	3	
	134.09	5,477	2	
	.134.14	6,623	2	
	134.15	1,639	1	
	134.16	4,133	0	
	134.18	6,037	5	
Total		37,360	18	.48/thousand
New Home Area	Census Tract	Population	Number of Burglaries	Burglary Rate
	133.10	2212	2	
	133.11	7849	0	
Total		10,061	2	.20/thousand

(See map on next page)

Residential Burglary

Jan - Mar 2001

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Yellow = New Homes
Green = Mixed Ane Homes

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